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Negotiated Settlement Under MiLB FinalOffer Salary Arbitration System
J. Richard Hill

Department of Economics, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, MI

Nicholas A. Jolly

Department of Economics, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI

Abstract
This paper provides a detailed analysis of negotiated salaries under Major League Baseball's final ‐ offer
arbitration process using data from the 2007–2010 seasons. There is a wage premium of 25% for hitters and
14% for pitchers filing for arbitration. Interestingly, there is an additional premium for exchanging offers for
hitters but not for pitchers. The additional premium in salary for hitters who exchange offers with their clubs
amounts to 7%.
Abbreviations
CBA
Collective Bargaining Agreement
FOSA
Final ‐ Offer Salary Arbitration
MLB
Major League Baseball

I. INTRODUCTION
In negotiated settlements, the costs of reaching an agreement can be expensive in terms of both time and
money. If both sides could realize the objective, unbiased, end result from the beginning, then an accord could
be reached quickly. This is rarely the case. In industrial relations, the use of mediators and arbitrators is designed
to assist union and management negotiators in reaching a contract settlement. The use of mandatory interest
arbitration to resolve bargaining disputes is found predominantly in the public sector; this is designed to reduce
the negotiation costs to taxpayers. Unable to reach a settlement, unionized police, firefighters, teachers, and the
respective governing bodies in charge of the budgets of these employee groups are often forced to allow a
neutral, third party to decide the major fiscal contents of their new collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). In
rare cases such as in New Jersey, the wages of police and firefighters are determined by final-offer arbitration, a
system in which the arbitrator is constrained to choose either the offer proposed by the union or the offer
proposed by the management. Final-offer arbitration was designed to reduce the use of expensive arbitration
as, in theory, the requirement that the arbitrator must accept the final offer of one side or the other would push
both sides closer together and allow for a negotiated settlement.
Major League Baseball (MLB) has used a system of final-offer salary arbitration (FOSA) since 1973 to determine
the salaries of players of a certain experience level. Baseball's FOSA process was thought to provide a
“laboratory experiment” that would provide greater insight into the workings of such a system of interest
arbitration because of the level of data available for analysis. The historical record of these cases has been
studied extensively by economists to analyze topics such as the determinants of arbitrators' decisions, the
determinants of the probability that the dispute will end in arbitration, and the effect of each party's willingness
to bear risk on the salary outcome. Much of the previous research into baseball's final-offer system has centered
on the final offers themselves and the arbitrators' decisions. However, under baseball's system, a negotiated
salary agreement can come at any point before the arbitration panel renders a decision.
This paper uses data from the 2007 through 2010 seasons and analyzes negotiated salaries under three out of
the four separate stages of the FOSA system: those who are eligible for arbitration and do not file for it; those
who file for arbitration and do not exchange salaries; and those who exchange salaries and do not reach the
arbitration stage of the process. Specifically, the analysis provides estimates of the average treatment effect for
players moving to each subsequent, aforementioned stage in the bargaining process. No other studies of the
FOSA process in MLB have examined the effects of filing for arbitration on the salaries for players. Other
published studies have used the list of players who filed for arbitration as their dataset. This ignores the first
step in the baseball arbitration process.1Burgess and Marburger (1993) concluded that arbitration awards won
by players were higher and those won by owners were lower than negotiated settlements for comparable
players. Miller (2000b) found that negotiated salaries that occurred after the exchange of final offers under
arbitration were significantly different from those for free agents, while Marburger (2004) found that the
average free agent salary was a significant determinant of both player and management final offers. Other
researchers (Farmer, Pecorin, and Stango 2004; Miller 2000a) have examined the role of risk in shaping the
outcome of negotiated and arbitrated settlements after the exchange of final offers. Therefore, the majority of
the earlier literature has focused on the stages of the process after each side has made and exchanged final
offers. Because the majority of players who are eligible for salary arbitration today settle before the exchange of
offers, it is important to understand the earliest stages of the process, which is the focus of this paper.
The rest of this paper proceeds by examining the FOSA process in MLB in Section II. Theory and the previous
literature are discussed in Section III. Section IV provides a discussion of the data, model, and empirical
methodology, while Section V details the results of the analysis. Section VI offers conclusions.

II. THE FINAL-OFFER SALARY ARBITRATION PROCESS
The FOSA system began with the 1973 CBA. The FOSA system has four distinct stages: players being eligible for
arbitration; filing for arbitration and not exchanging offers; exchanging offers and settling prior to arbitration;
and arbitrating salaries.2 Service time determines whether a player is eligible for FOSA.3 Currently, eligible
players are those who have between 3 and 6 years of service time.4 Players with 2 years of service who had at
least 86 days of service during the preceding season and ranked in the top 17% in total service among this group
are eligible as well (these players are known as the super-twos).5 Players know if they meet these eligibility
criteria shortly after the conclusion of the season. Either eligible players or owners can file for arbitration
between January 5 and 15 following a season. Players and clubs exchange offers by January 18. The league then
schedules arbitration hearings between February 1 and 20. A three-member arbitration panel renders a decision
usually within 24 hours after the conclusion of the hearing.6 The panel must choose either the salary offer of the
player or the club and cannot render a compromised settlement.
The parties can negotiate a salary any time before the arbitration panel renders its decision, and this occurs in
the majority of cases. For example, between 2007 and 2010, 567 players were eligible for FOSA. Of those
players, 467 (approximately 81% of the eligible) filed for arbitration, 182 players (about 32% of the eligible) filed
for arbitration and exchanged offers, and 22 players (about 4% of the eligible) went through the entire
arbitration process. In fact, 385 players (68%) settled before the exchange of offers. Using data from 1993 to
1996, Farmer, Pecorin, and Stango (2004) had a sample of 527 players who filed for arbitration, with only 82
(16% of those who filed) players settling before an exchange of offers, 374 (71% of those who filed) exchanging
offers, and 71 (13% of those who filed) receiving arbitrated settlements. Because the authors only use a sample
containing players who filed for arbitration, it is difficult to get a direct comparison of the numbers. Still,
however, there is a dramatic contrast in some of these figures: 374 players exchanging offers in the 1993–1996
period versus 182 players in the 2007–2010 period; 71 settlements reached by arbitration from 1993 to 1996
versus 22 settlements reached by arbitration in the 2007–2010 period.
The contrast in these figures illustrates the belief that a change in the approach to the use of salary arbitration
has taken place despite no change in the rules and regulations governing the process. If there is an accepted
relationship between salary and past performance, then this may explain why some agreements on salary are
being reached during earlier stages of the negotiation process. Another potential explanation follows the
reasoning of Brown and Link (2010) that labor relations are more harmonious now between the owners and the
players following previous decades of discord over collusion by owners and strikes by the players.

III. THEORY AND PREVIOUS LITERATURE
A beginning point for almost all of the theoretical models on FOSA in baseball is the work of Farber (1980). Using
his basic construct for final-offer arbitration, it is assumed that an arbitrator will choose the offer made by a club
if:

(1)

|𝑦𝑦A − 𝑦𝑦c | < |𝑦𝑦A − 𝑦𝑦P |.

where 𝑦𝑦A represents the arbitrator's calculation of an objective salary for the player given the criteria set forth
in the CBA, 𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐 is the offer rendered by the club, and 𝑦𝑦P is the offer from the player or his agent; it is assumed
that 𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐 and 𝑦𝑦P are a function of 𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴 . The player's offer will be chosen if the inequality holds in the opposite
direction.
Under the assumption that clubs' and players' salary offers are risk-neutral and arbitrators are unbiased and
interchangeable, Faurot and McAllister (1992) find that four of the criteria listed in the CBA are all significant

determinants of the expected value of the arbitrators' fair settlement. Fizel (1996) finds racial bias in the
decisions rendered by arbitrators. Marburger and Burgess (2004b) use a probit model to predict the winning
offers in arbitration cases. They conclude that the FOSA process not only favors reasonable offers but also
creates an incentive to settle before arbitration to avoid unfavorable rulings.
Farber's (1980) model can also be used to analyze the effect of each side's level of risk-aversion on the outcome.
If 𝐹𝐹(𝑦𝑦A ) represents the distribution of the arbitrator's fair settlement and is assumed to be known by both sides,
then the club chooses a bid 𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐 that will maximize
(2)

�1 −

𝐹𝐹(𝑦𝑦c + 𝑦𝑦p )
𝑦𝑦c + 𝑦𝑦p
� 𝑦𝑦c + 𝐹𝐹 �
� 𝑦𝑦p ,
2
2

assuming that utility from the bids are strictly concave and increase monotonically. The player selects his
bid, 𝑦𝑦P in a symmetrical fashion. From these, each side derives a reaction function to the other's optimal offer
and the simultaneous solution of each yields Nash equilibrium.

Farber (1980) discusses the so-called contract zone as an area in which parties may reach an agreement because
of a convergence of their final offers. This contract zone can be defined as:

(3)

𝑦𝑦c < 𝑦𝑦L < 𝑦𝑦U < 𝑦𝑦p ,

where 𝑦𝑦L is the lower bound of the zone and 𝑦𝑦U is the upper bound. Some research has focused on the contract
zone. Marburger (2004a) suggests that final offers by both management and players are a weighted average of
the player's past season compensation and the average free agent salary of the current season; this same result
holds using only cases that ended in arbitration. Hadley and Ruggiero (2006) use nonparametric analysis and
conclude that arbitrators and the FOSA process are approximately mimicking the free agent process.
Faber (1980) contends that if uncertainty over 𝑦𝑦A , the arbitrator's fair settlement, disappears, then the contract
zone shrinks to 𝑦𝑦A as both 𝑦𝑦c and 𝑦𝑦𝑃𝑃 are a function of 𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴 . However, if uncertainty increases the gap between the
final offers, then arbitrated settlements may increase. These are said to be of “low quality” by Farber (1980) as
they fall outside the contract zone. The conclusion by Burgess and Marburger (1993) that arbitrated salaries
won by players were higher and those won by management were lower in the baseball FOSA system than
negotiated salaries for comparable players offers empirical verification of Farber's conclusion.
Miller (2000b) incorporates negotiating costs into his theoretical model to allow for negotiated settlements in
baseball's FOSA system. Farber (1980) concludes that costs of arbitration widen the contract zone and increase
the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. However, if costs are asymmetrical, then the party subject to the
higher costs will become more risk-averse and the resulting contract zone will move unfavorably for this party
and get larger overall. According to baseball's CBA, the hearing costs of arbitration are borne equally by the club
and player, and each is responsible for his own expenses and those of his counsel or other representatives. Since
a club may reap some economies of scale if hearings are set for more than one player, it is possible that costs
are asymmetrical.
The basic Farber model can be used to frame the current empirical research, but some interesting questions
arise. To what extent does filing for arbitration differ from simple eligibility for arbitration in the effect on a
negotiated salary? Second, to what extent does exchanging offers differ from simply filing in the effect on a
negotiated salary? Previous studies of baseball's FOSA system have not dealt with these issues. Marburger and

Scoggins (1996) use a probit model to determine that higher quality players are more likely to file for arbitration
and press for an arbitrated settlement. This means that selectivity bias is a likely problem in the estimation of
salary equations for a self-selecting group of players. Farmer, Pecorin, and Stango (2004) use a two-stage
process to adjust for any selectivity bias to isolate the effect of aggressive bargaining behavior on negotiated
versus arbitrated salaries. Likewise, Miller (2000a) uses probit models for arbitration-eligible and free agent
players to correct for any selectivity bias in salary regressions.
This paper has reviewed the Farber (1980) model in this section. It discusses the Miller (2000a) model in Section
4B. Both serve as starting points for the research presented here. Recall that the purpose of this paper is to
analyze negotiated salary outcomes at the three early stages of MLB's FOSA process. Farber (1980) focuses on
how final offers are created along with the consequences for negotiated settlements. Miller (2000a) examines
bargaining after final offers have already been exchanged. None of these papers models the bargaining that
takes place before the exchange of final offers, however. Therefore, there are no implications from these
models that provide a hypothesis that is being tested in this paper. The estimated equation presented below
would require a bargaining model that allows negotiations to occur before the exchange of final offers. Many
bargaining models already exist that can be usefully extended to include bargaining behavior before the
exchange of final offers, and, specifically, the decision to file for arbitration. While this type of extension is
beyond the scope of this paper, it would be a fruitful area for future research.7

IV. DATA, MODEL, AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
A. Data
The dataset for this study includes the salaries of all arbitration-eligible players from the 2007 through 2010
seasons. The data also include previous season and career performance statistics for these players.8 The data is
disaggregated into two subgroups. The first subgroup contains hitters and the second subgroup contains
pitchers. Recall that the purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of advancement through each of the
first three stages of the FOSA process on players' salaries. To this end, each subgroup is delineated by the four
stages; players who are eligible; players who file for arbitration; those who exchange salary offers; and those
who proceed through the entire arbitration process.
Table 1 provides summary statistics by subgroup and arbitration stage. The top panel of the table contains
information for hitters, while the bottom panel is for pitchers. Each stage of the FOSA process listed in Table 1 is
mutually exclusive. In other words, the column labeled “Eligible” provides statistics for those players who are
eligible for arbitration and do not file for arbitration; the column “Filed” contains statistics for those who file for
arbitration and do not exchange salary offers with the teams' owners. The column labeled “Exchanged” displays
statistics for those players who exchange salary offers and do not proceed through the arbitration process;
“Arbitrated” provides calculations for those players who proceed through the entire FOSA process.9 Finally, the
first column of the table lists the variables of interest.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics by Player Type and Eligibility Status
Hitters
Eligible
Filed
Exchanged
Previous salary
772,491
700,595
637,329
Current salary
925,868
1,249,929 1,556,606
Service time
4.03
3.55
3.44
Team attendance
2,443,523 2,538,231 2,604,545
Team winning percentage 0.49
0.51
0.51
At bats
316.37
365.33
490.00

Arbitrated
578,874
1,969,986
3.53
2,135,266
0.51
471.73

Career at bats
Slugging average
Career slugging average
On base percentage
Career on base percentage
Sample sizes

1404.92
1401.84
1540.56
1616.91
0.39
0.43
0.45
0.43
0.41
0.42
0.44
0.44
0.32
0.33
0.35
0.34
0.33
0.33
0.34
0.34
51
127
77
11
Pitchers
Eligible
Filed
Exchanged Arbitrated
Previous salary
651,451
606,065
614,656
912,857
Current salary
957,774
1,054,612 1,304,721 1,832,635
Service time
3.89
3.80
3.72
3.74
Team attendance
2,435,287 2,536,583 2,614,206 2,697,242
Team winning percentage 0.50
0.50
0.50
0.47
Saves
3.31
4.67
3.67
12.45
Innings pitched
75.61
87.25
121.18
95.37
Career innings pitched
365.97
380.94
445.37
400.89
Earned run average
4.73
4.10
3.80
3.57
Career earned run average 4.31
4.12
4.05
3.81
Relief pitcher
36
111
48
6
Sample sizes
54
153
83
11
Notes: The categories listed in the column are mutually exclusive. In other words, the category Eligible indicates
that the players are eligible for arbitration but did not file. Those who filed for arbitration did not exchange
offers. Those who exchanged offers did not go through the arbitration process.
Source: Authors' calculations taken from the data. See text for discussion.
Table 1 shows that for both hitters and pitchers, the previous season's salary is lower and the current season's
salary is higher as players proceed through each stage of final-offer arbitration. This provides transient evidence
that there is a premium associated with each FOSA stage. Table 1 also shows that those who receive more
playing time are more likely to proceed through each stage of the arbitration process. This is true for hitters and
pitchers as evidenced by the increases in at bats and career at bats for hitters and innings pitched and career
innings pitched for pitchers. Hitters and pitchers with less service time appear to be more likely to proceed
through each stage of the arbitration process. Finally, better players are more likely to enter into the later stages
of the FOSA process as evidenced by the changes in the performance statistics displayed in Table 1. These
descriptive statistics indicate that there is selection, potentially, into the various stages of the FOSA process.

B. Model and Methodology: Treatment Effects of Filing and Exchanging Offers
As stated previously the underlying model for the previous work in this area is the theoretical model developed
by Farber (1980) in which a contract zone is developed based on the objective salary for the player estimated by
a neutral, unbiased arbitrator, and the final offers of the player and the club. Miller (2000a) offers an approach
that better fits the focus of this research but it must be adapted to allow for negotiated settlements both before
and after the exchange of final offers. Consider an intertemporal version of the Miller (2000a) cooperative
bargaining model in which Nash equilibrium is found from
(4)

∗
𝑦𝑦ns
= arg max 𝑦𝑦ns (𝑈𝑈cs (1 − 𝑦𝑦ns ) − 𝑑𝑑cs ) × �𝑈𝑈ps (𝑦𝑦ns ) − 𝑑𝑑ps �,

where 𝑦𝑦ns is the salary reached through negotiation in stage s of the FOSA process. The utility of the club in step
s, 𝑈𝑈cs , and the utility of the player in step s, 𝑈𝑈ps , are a function of the bargained salary and the respective
disagreement outcomes in step s, 𝑑𝑑cs and 𝑑𝑑ps , the expected utility of proceeding to the next step, 𝑠𝑠 + 1, in the
arbitration process. Let 𝑦𝑦cs and 𝑦𝑦ps be the salary offers of the club and player respectively in stage s; these offers
are unobservable in the early stages of the process but represent the final offers in the latter stages of the
process. From the disagreement functions10 and Equation (4) above, the first-order condition defines the
function for the negotiated salary
(5)

∗
∗
𝑦𝑦ns
= 𝑦𝑦ns
�𝑑𝑑cs �𝑦𝑦cs , 𝑦𝑦ps �𝑑𝑑ps �𝑦𝑦cs , 𝑦𝑦ps ��.

Miller (2000a) notes how Equation (5) is an increasing function in the disagreement point for players and a
decreasing function in the disagreement point for clubs. Recall that there are three stages under scrutiny in this
research: negotiated settlements for eligible players who do not file for arbitration, negotiated settlements for
players who file for arbitration but settle before an exchange of offers, and negotiated settlements for players
who file and exchange offers but settle without arbitration. Therefore, if there is an increase in negotiated salary
during each subsequent stage in the bargaining process, then it can be interpreted that the arbitration process is
either increasing the disagreement point for players or decreasing the disagreement point for the clubs.
Obviously, the wage offers of the club and the player are a function of the player's past performance and years
of experience. Asymmetric information may cause a divergence between the player and club offers. These
differences may shrink as more information is exchanged between parties in subsequent stages of the process.
The willingness to assume risk in the negotiation process will shape offers as well. It seems likely that both sides
may be willing to assume more risk in the earlier stages of the process before the exchange of final offers. The
act of making a final offer leaves either party vulnerable to an adverse decision should the opposing side opt for
arbitration. The costs of negotiation, both real and psychic, can also play a role in the utility maximization of
each side. Real costs of negotiation may be minimal during early stages where offers can be exchanged via
phone or fax. Costs of an arbitrated decision are borne equally by parties and include airfare and/or hotel stays
for the arbitrator, expert witness, and/or lawyers/agents. Psychic costs include the psychological stress for
players not knowing where they and their families may be living next season. For club general managers and
coaches there is stress from dealing with players disgruntled by the negotiation process.
The cost of disagreement favors management in the pre-filing stage of the process as players must accept a
contract from management if they do not file for arbitration. This may cause better players to advance to the
filing stage to increase their bargaining power, that is, their disagreement point. Marburger and Scoggins
(1996) find that higher quality players are more likely to file for arbitration and press for an arbitrated
settlement. After filing, but before the exchange of final offers, it is unclear which side has an advantage. Once
final offers are exchanged, both sides face the prospect of an adverse decision by the arbitration panel. Perhaps
better players feel that they have an advantage because clubs may want to keep them happy so their
performance is not negatively affected by the rancor that can surround negotiations. This implies that there
should be a relatively higher salary premium associated with filing for arbitration instead of for exchanging final
offers.
Recall that the purpose of this paper is to analyze how the process of moving to each subsequent stage of MLB's
FOSA process influences the salary of players. As suggested in Table 1, there appears to be a salary premium
associated with moving to each stage. Therefore, it is logical to think of the process of filing for arbitration, or
the act of officially exchanging offers with the team as a type of program in which players participate, and these
various programs should influence salaries in one way or another. The empirical methodology will estimate the

average treatment effects on players' salaries of moving to each subsequent stage in the FOSA process. Table
1 also shows that better players appear to be more likely to move on to each stage. Therefore, the estimated
equations need to account for selection into the participation of each program, that is, filing and/or exchanging
final offers. If selection on observable characteristics is assumed, then a standard model for estimating the
average treatment effects is the following:
(6)

ln(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) = β0 + β1 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + β2 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + β3 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 − 𝑥𝑥̅ ) + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .

In Equation (6), ln(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) is the natural log of player i's salary in season t. The 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 contains a set of previous
season performance characteristics, team-specific variables, and dummy variables for position played, year, a
player being eligible for arbitration for the first time, and a negotiated salary resulting in a multi-year contract.
The full set of variables contained in 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 is in Table 2.
Table 2. List of Variables for Regressions
Common Variables
Hitters Only
Log of previous salary
At bats
Service time
Career at bats divided by service
time
Team attendance
Slugging average
(1,000,000)
Team winning percentage Career slugging average
Year dummy variables
On base percentage
First time eligibility
Career on base percentage
dummy
Multiyear contract
First base dummy
dummy
Second base dummy
Third base dummy
Catcher dummy
Short stop dummy

Pitchers Only
Saves
Innings pitched

Career innings pitched divided by service time
Earned run average
Career earned run average
Relief dummy
Relief dummy × innings pitched
Relief dummy × (career innings
pitched/service time)
Relief dummy × saves

Equation (6) is estimated separately for hitters and pitchers. For each sample, Equation (6) is estimated twice.
The first time, the sample used includes players who are eligible for arbitration and those who filed for it and did
not officially exchange salary offers with their team. The second time uses the sample of players who filed for
arbitration and exchanged salary offers but did not move to the final stage of the arbitration process. Given that
only 22 players (11 hitters and 11 pitchers) actually moved to the arbitration stage, they are excluded from the
analysis sample. The variable 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the player filed for arbitration (for the first
estimation) or officially exchanged a salary offer with his team (during the second estimation) between
seasons 𝑡𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡𝑡. The estimate of β1 is the average treatment effect for moving to each subsequent stage in
the arbitration process. The interactions between 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 and the de-meaned variables contained in Table 2 help
to control for selection on observable characteristics.11

V. RESULTS

The results from Equation (4) are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 presents the results for hitters, and Table
4 is for pitchers. The first column in each table contains the independent variables used in the analysis. The

second and third columns present the parameter estimates by different subsamples of the data. Model 1 uses
the sample of players who did not exchange salary offers. Put another way, Model 1 focuses on the movement
from being eligible to filing for arbitration but not exchanging salary offers. Model 2 uses the sample of players
who file for arbitration and do not go all of the way through the arbitration process. In other words, Model 2
examines the movement from filing for arbitration to exchanging salary offers.
Table 3. Treatment Effects of Filing and/or Exchanging on Salary—Hitters
Sample
No Exchange Model 1 File and Exchange Model 2
Log of previous salary
0.218
0.245
*
(1.70)
(4.91)***
Service time
0.081
0.174
(0.89)
(4.15)***
Team attendance (1,000,000) −0.069
−0.045
(1.08)
(1.37)
Winning percentage
1.063
0.575
(1.91)*
(1.70)*
At bats
0.002
0.002
***
(3.27)
(8.07)***
Career at bats/service time
0.001
0.002
(2.05)**
(7.24)***
Slugging average
−2.049
0.751
(1.56)
(1.00)
Career slugging average
7.092
3.174
(4.65)***
(2.75)**
On base percentage
3.447
1.261
**
(2.50)
(0.89)
Career on base percentage
−3.162
−1.985
(1.50)
(0.94)
First base
0.423
−0.075
**
(2.11)
(0.55)
Second base
0.047
−0.092
(0.48)
(1.45)
Third base
−0.214
0.050
**
(2.18)
(0.66)
Catcher
0.019
0.137
(0.13)
(2.51)**
Short stop
−0.106
0.017
(1.01)
(0.25)
First time eligible
−0.012
0.048
(0.10)
(0.76)
Multiyear contract
0.023
−0.111
(0.29)
(1.18)
Filed
0.223
—
(3.54)***
—
Exchange
—
0.072
—
(2.06)**

Observations
178
204
R2
0.93
0.94
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the team level used in the calculations. All
regressions include year dummy variables and interactions between the treatment dummy variable and the
demeaned independent variables listed in Table 2. See text for discussion.
*
Significant at 10%;
**
significant at 5%;
***
significant at 1%.
Table 4. Treatment Effects of Filing and/or Exchanging on Salary—Pitchers
Sample
No Exchange Model 1 File and Exchange Model 2
Log of previous salary
0.323
0.346
(3.01)***
(5.89)***
Service time
0.163
0.111
**
(2.66)
(4.66)***
Team attendance (1,000,000)
−0.005
−0.019
(0.07)
(0.49)
Winning percentage
0.860
−0.657
(1.20)
(1.21)
Saves
−0.019
−0.019
(0.09)
(0.10)
Innings pitched
0.007
0.006
***
(3.66)
(4.48)***
Career innings pitched/service time
4.45E-04
0.002
(0.19)
(1.85)*
Earned run average
−0.002
−0.069
(0.18)
(3.91)***
Career earned run average
−0.132
−0.130
*
(1.72)
(4.26)***
Relief dummy
−0.082
0.414
(0.38)
(1.91)*
Relief × saves
0.043
0.046
(0.22)
(0.24)
Relief × innings pitched
−0.003
−0.003
(1.10)
(1.43)
Relief × (career innings pitched/service time) 0.003
−0.002
(0.98)
(1.17)
First time eligible
−0.025
0.015
(0.30)
(0.19)
Multiyear contract
0.152
0.030
(0.60)
(0.35)
Filed
0.134
—
**
(2.16)
—
Exchanged
—
−0.028
—
(0.82)

Observations
207
236
R2
0.88
0.88
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the team level used in the calculations. All
regressions include year dummy variables and interactions between the treatment dummy variable and the
demeaned independent variables listed in Table 2. See text for discussion.
*
Significant at 10%;
**
significant at 5%;
***
significant at 1%.
Before analyzing the average treatment effects, the coefficients associated with the variables found in Table
2 are discussed. Results in Tables 3 and 4 show some similarities with regards to pay between hitters and
pitchers. Service time and the previous season's salary appear to influence positively the current season's salary.
Additionally, those players who receive more playing time receive higher salaries. This can be seen through the
positive and significant coefficients associated with at bats for hitters and innings pitched for pitchers. As
expected, better performance also results in higher negotiated salaries as evidenced by the significant
coefficients associated with career slugging average for hitters and career earned run average for pitchers.
Interestingly, being eligible for arbitration for the first time and salary negotiations resulting in multi-year
contracts have no discernible impact on players' current salaries. One difference between hitters and pitchers
in Tables 3 and 4 is the effect of team variables on salaries. The team's previous winning percentage positively
affects current season's salary for hitters but not pitchers.
As Table 1 suggests, there may be a salary premium for those players who proceed through each stage of the
FOSA process. Table 3 presents estimates of the average treatment effect for hitters who move to each
subsequent stage. Focusing on Model 1, Table 3 indicates that there is a positive and highly significant gain for
hitters who file for arbitration but do not exchange salaries with their clubs. Those who file and do not exchange
offers increase their salary by 25%.12 Model 2 indicates that those who move from filing to exchanging offers
receive a salary premium of 7%, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Therefore, the conclusion
presented by these results is that filing for arbitration substantially increases a player's salary when compared to
simply being eligible for it. Furthermore, exchanging final offers does provide an additional increase in salary. It
is not nearly as large, however, as the initial increase from filing for arbitration.
Table 4 presents the treatment effects for pitchers. Focusing on Model 1, the results show that those pitchers
who move from eligibility to filing and not exchanging offers increase their salary by 14%. This treatment effect
is statistically significant; however, it is much smaller in magnitude when compared with the results in Table
3 for hitters. Results in Model 2 show that there is a negative and statistically insignificant relationship for
moving from filing to exchanging offers. Combined, these results imply that there is a premium for filing for
arbitration as opposed to being eligible, and there is no salary premium for exchanging offers once a pitcher has
already filed for arbitration. The results in Table 4 are different from those found in Table 3 for hitters. Hitters
receive significant salary gains when moving to each stage of the arbitration process, and the gain is larger when
filing for arbitration. Pitchers, on the other hand, only receive a gain in salary for filing, and this gain is
approximately 11 percentage points lower than that for hitters. This finding suggests that hitters and pitchers
are treated differently during the negotiation process.
Overall, the empirical results suggest that both hitters and pitchers can improve their salaries by filing for
arbitration rather than just being eligible to do so. It is possible that filing for arbitration spurs owners into more
good faith negotiations through the threat of possibly moving forward to the final stage of the arbitration
process, which is costly.13 This result is somewhat surprising. Why would players not file for arbitration, a
relatively costless process, if it meant an increase in salary? Previous studies have not analyzed separately the

filing phase of the FOSA process. Perhaps the adjustment for selectivity bias used here is not accounting for all of
the potential selection. Instead, the result could be capturing the effect of better players filing for arbitration
while lesser players do not. However, different sets of explanatory variables and different methods for
accounting for the potential selection into each stage of the arbitration process have been used. The
quantitative and qualitative results are similar and available upon request. Therefore, the results presented
in Tables 3 and 4 are robust to different empirical specifications.
A potential explanation for the large salary premium associated with filing and the small/no premium associated
with exchanging offers for hitters/pitchers, respectively, is that there is only a short amount of time between
these stages, typically 3 days. Perhaps the rush to finish negotiations before the official exchange of offers,
threat of arbitration, and the cost incurred by such, are responsible for the larger bump in salary for filing as
opposed to exchanging. Once offers are exchanged, valuable information is then available for all participants in
the process to see and analyze. There is a longer timeframe in which to continue negotiations before arbitration
hearings are held, typically 2 weeks to a month.
The size of the salary increases in the filing stage and smaller and/or lack of significant increases for the
exchange phase suggest that the process is starting to push agreement to resolution much earlier. Ashenfelter
and Dahl (2005) analyze settlements determined by final-offer arbitration for wages of police and firefighters in
New Jersey. The authors conclude that individuals who use experts during the arbitration process fair better
than those who do not, and knowledge of this benefit develops over time. The extensive use of agents by
players during the negotiation process in MLB and the historic institutional knowledge created over the years
may be finally creating the intended result of the process design.
The difference in the size of the salary increases for hitters versus pitchers is not surprising. Pitchers are more
susceptible to career shortening/ending shoulder or arm injuries. This risk creates greater variability in their
performances and lessens the expected value for the future from good performances in the past. Miller
(2000a) also found differences in risk-assuming behavior by negotiators for position players versus starting
pitchers.

VI. CONCLUSIONS
The number of salaries actually determined by arbitration in MLB has declined in recent years, suggesting that
there has been a shift in the use of the FOSA system even though there has been no change in the operation of
the system. Because of this, the focus of this paper is on the salary determination process at the three initial
stages of the FOSA process. Treatment effects are estimated for filing for arbitration and exchanging offers.
Results indicate that, among hitters who become eligible for arbitration, those who file for arbitration receive a
wage premium of 25%; the exchange of offers increases salaries by 7%. For pitchers, there is a salary premium of
14% for filing for arbitration and no premium associated with exchanging offers. The difference in findings for
hitters and pitchers suggests that they are treated differently during the negotiation process.
This paper methodologically contributes to the literature in a number of ways. This is the first paper on MLB to
use information from the most recent seasons, 2007 to 2010, a time period in which salary negotiation cases
that were ultimately determined by arbitration were at historic lows. Additionally, the analysis makes use of
statistics on service time as opposed to experience. This is important since the CBA states that it is service time,
as opposed to experience, that dictates eligibility for arbitration. Finally, this is the first paper to focus explicitly
on the salary determination process of players in each of the first three stages of the arbitration process: being
eligible for arbitration; filing for arbitration and not exchanging offers; and exchanging offers and not continuing
through to arbitration.

The results of the analysis offer interesting conclusions that the previous literature has not shown. There is a
salary premium for both hitters and pitchers for filing for arbitration; however, there is only a premium for
exchanging offers for hitters, and this premium is substantially smaller than that for filing for arbitration. The
previous literature has not shown this. This particular result is similar to the literature on free agency, which has
shown that the threat of free agency seems to increase salaries, while going to the free agent market does not.
Given the rise in the use of final-offer arbitration, particularly in the public sector, the results from this analysis
may shed some light on the construct of the final-offer arbitration processes. The analysis does not necessarily
give insight into the evolution of the FOSA system used in MLB. However, the limited number of cases that
proceed to the arbitration stage in the time period of this study and the finding that players benefit significantly,
on average, from filing for arbitration suggests that the design of this system may be finally achieving the overall
goal of final-offer arbitration to encourage cooperative bargaining.

Footnotes
1 Beginning with 2007, an internet website (Cot's Contract website at http://mlbcontracts.blogspot.com) made
available a list of players who were eligible for arbitration based on service time.
2 Players who are eligible for free agency and offered salary arbitration by their team are not considered here.
3 The CBA defines one day of service as each day a player is on a team's active roster. It takes 172 days to get
one service year. The days begin with the first regularly scheduled game in a season and conclude with
the last regularly scheduled game in a season.
4 Before the 1985 CBA, players used to be eligible after two years of service time.
5 Super-twos were added to the 1990 CBA.
6 The use of a three-member panel rather than a single arbitrator began with the 1997 CBA. The arbitration
panel can only consider the following six criteria when rendering a decision: (1) the quality of the
player's contribution to his team in the past season, including performance, leadership, and public
appeal; (2) the length and consistency of the player's career performance; (3) the record of the player's
past compensation; (4) comparative baseball salaries; (5) mental or physical player defects; and (6)
recent performance by the club, including league standing and attendance.
7 The authors thank an anonymous referee for the points made in this paragraph.
8 The salary data comes from the USA Today online database found
at http://content.usatoday.com/sportsdata/baseball/mlb/salaries/team. Most data on service time and
arbitration eligibility come from the Cot's Contract website at http://mlbcontracts.blogspot.com/. Some
biographical data, arbitration eligibility data, and service time data on players are from the Baseball
Reference database at http://www.baseball-reference.com/. Performance data and some biographical
data come from the Baseball Almanac at http://www.baseball-almanac.com/.
9 Although this paper does not concentrate on arbitrated salaries, the descriptive statistics are provided here for
completeness. Only 22 players proceed through the arbitration stage. Therefore, any econometrics
performed on this subgroup would be very imprecise.
10 These are not shown but can be found in Miller (2000a), 42.
11 See Wooldridge (2002) for a complete discussion of this model.
12 The exact percentage changes come from the formula eβ− 1.
13 The authors thank an anonymous referee for making this suggestion.
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